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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 49Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nom-
inal rigidities, capital accumulation and ﬁnite lifetimes. The framework exhibits
intergenerational wealth eﬀects and is intended to investigate the macroeconomic
implications of ﬁscal policy, which is speciﬁed by either a debt-based tax rule or
a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary deﬁcits. When calibrated to euro
area quarterly data, the model predicts that ﬁscal expansions generate a trade-
oﬀ in output dynamics between short-term gains and medium-term losses. It is
also shown that the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks crucially depend upon the conduct of
monetary policy. Simulation analysis suggests that balanced-budget requirements
enhance the determinacy properties of feedback interest rate rules by guaranteeing
inﬂation stabilization.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52; E58; E63.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy; Nominal Rigidities; Capital Accu-
mulation; Finite Lifetime; Simulations.
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July 2006Non-Technical Summary
The implications of alternative ﬁscal policies and the joint role of ﬁscal and monetary
policies for macroeconomic stability and price developments are major topics in the on-
going policy debate as well as in the academic research. In the European Union the ﬁscal
rules established by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact are consis-
tent with the view that ﬁscal discipline and sound budgetary positions are necessary for
macroeconomic and price stability, even in the presence of fully independent monetary
authorities.
This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with price stick-
iness, capital accumulation, investment adjustment costs and intergenerational wealth
eﬀects. Ricardian equivalence does not hold in our framework, because the assumption of
identical inﬁnitely-lived private agents is relaxed. In our general set-up with ﬁnitely-lived
individuals, ﬁnancial wealth aﬀects the dynamics of aggregate consumption. Hence, the
dynamics of both public debt and asset prices, as well as the money market, do matter
for the monetary and ﬁscal policy transmission mechanisms. The main aim of the present
paper is to investigate the role of ﬁscal policy for business cycle ﬂuctuations and the
macroeconomic performance of alternative ﬁscal rules. In particular, ﬁscal policy is de-
scribed by either a debt-based tax rule or a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary
deﬁcits. Monetary policy is summarized by a standard Taylor rule.
When calibrated to euro area quarterly data, the model predicts that equilibrium
determinacy depends on the speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy. The ‘Taylor principle’ (the
prescription that the long-run increase in the nominal interest rate for each permanent
increase in inﬂation should be more than one-to-one) might not be suﬃcient for equilib-
rium determinacy under a ‘passive’ feedback tax-rule of the Leeper-style, ensuring ﬁscal
solvency. On the other hand, under a balanced-budget ﬁscal rule, both ‘passive’ and
‘active’ monetary policies may be compatible with equilibrium uniqueness.
We ﬁnd that ﬁscal expansions are likely to generate a trade-oﬀ in output dynam-
ics between short-term gains and medium-term losses. Speciﬁcally, positive ﬁscal shocks
are expansionary in the short run but are shown to induce persistent negative eﬀects on
economic activity in the medium run. Furthermore, we show that the macroeconomic
eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks crucially depend on the conduct of monetary policy. This result
provides support to the view that controlling for monetary policy is essential for an accu-
rate empirical characterization of the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks. Finally, simulation analysis
suggests that balanced-budget requirements, beyond enhancing the determinacy prop-
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July 20061 Introduction
The implications of diﬀerent ﬁscal policies and the interaction between ﬁscal and monetary
policies in terms of macroeconomic stability and price developments are key topics in the
current policy debate as well as in the academic research. In particular, ﬁscal discipline
and sound budgetary positions are considered to be essential for macroeconomic and price
stability, even in the presence of a fully independent monetary authority. This is reﬂected
in the ﬁscal rules enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact
of the European Union.1
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (dsge) models, incorporating imperfect com-
petition and nominal rigidities, are increasingly adopted as the basic tool-kit for the eval-
uation of monetary policy.2 However, in the inﬁnitely-lived representative agent paradigm
in which the Ricardian equivalence holds, changes in public debt have no eﬀect on aggre-
gate consumption and potential redistributions of wealth across generations are neglected.
Fiscal policy matters for price stability mainly when it is ‘active’ in Leeper (1991)’s sense
and the stability of real public debt is not respected for any bounded sequences of all other
endogenous variables.3 Alternatively, the introduction of distortionary taxation, along the
lines suggested by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004), or the introduction of rule-of-thumb
consumers, as proposed by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es (2003, 2004), allow to examine
the non-trivial implications of ‘passive’ ﬁscal policies, when ﬁscal solvency is guaranteed.
In this paper we focus on a diﬀerent line of research in which the Ricardian equivalence
proposition is not satisﬁed, because the assumption of identical inﬁnitely-lived private
agents is relaxed. Starting from the ﬁnite-lifetime approach ﬁrst outlined by Yaari (1965)
and Blanchard (1985), we enrich the analysis by incorporating the overlapping generations
1The general government deﬁcit should not exceed the 3% to gdp reference value and the debt to
gdp ratio should be below 60% or, if above, approach to that reference value at a satisfactory pace.
Furthermore, EMU Member States are required to have medium term objectives, which range from 1%
deﬁcit to close to balance or in surplus positions, depending on the country speciﬁc public debt ratio and
potential growth.
2See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999), McCallum and Nelson
(1999a, 1999b), Taylor (1999a), Gal´ ı (2003), Woodford (2003), and references therein.
3See Woodford (1998, 2001, 2003).
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and investment adjustment costs. We calibrate a linearized version of the model using
euro area quarterly data. Fiscal policy is described by either a debt-based tax rule or a
balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary deﬁcits, while monetary policy is summarized
by a standard Taylor rule. The proposed model is able to capture micro-founded wealth
eﬀects that inﬂuence aggregate consumption dynamics. Therefore, the lm relation and
the dynamics of both public debt and asset prices matter for the monetary and ﬁscal
policy transmission mechanisms. The theoretical framework we describe proves to be
particularly suitable for the analysis of macroeconomic implications of ﬁscal policy, also
when the ﬁscal authority aims at avoiding explosive paths for the public debt.
Analyzing the role of diﬀerent ﬁscal policy rules for business cycle ﬂuctuations and
for the design of monetary policy, we ﬁnd that equilibrium determinacy is aﬀected by
the speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy. First, the ‘Taylor principle’ (the nominal interest rate
responding more than one-to-one to a permanent increase in inﬂation in the long run4)
might not be suﬃcient for equilibrium determinacy under a ‘passive’ feedback tax-rule
of the Leeper-style. Second, both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ monetary policies are compatible
with equilibrium uniqueness under a balanced-budget rule.
A key prediction of the model is that ﬁscal expansions tend to generate an intertem-
poral trade-oﬀ: positive ﬁscal shocks are expansionary in the short run but are likely to
generate persistent adverse eﬀects on economic activity in the medium run, shading some
light in the debate on the so called non-keynesian eﬀects. We also show that the eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy crucially depend on the type of monetary policy rule adopted by the central
bank, providing a sound micro-founded rationale for the view, ﬁrst suggested by Sims
(1988), that empirical studies on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy should explicitly take into
account monetary factors.5 Finally, simulation analysis supports the view that balanced-
4See, e.g., Bullard and Mitra (2002) McCallum (2003), and Woodford (2001, 2003) for a discussion.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the model, derive the
ﬁrst order conditions and introduce the policy rules. The model is linearized around a non-
stochastic steady state and calibrated to euro area quarterly data in Section 3. Section
4 examines equilibrium properties and dynamics under alternative ﬁscal and monetary
policy rules. In Section 5 we develop stochastic simulations and assess the performance of
diﬀerent combinations of policy rules. The main conclusions are summarized in Section
6.
2 The Model
In this Section we develop a dsge model extended to incorporate capital accumulation
and overlapping generations. The economy consists of seven types of agents: ﬁnitely-
lived consumers, perfectly competitive life insurance companies, a continuum of ﬁrms
producing diﬀerentiated intermediate goods and setting nominal prices in a staggered
fashion, perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms, perfectly competitive capital producers,
the monetary authority and the ﬁscal authority.
2.1 Consumers
The demand-side is described by a stochastic discrete-time version of the Yaari (1965)-
Blanchard (1985) olg model with no intergenerational bequest motive, extended to in-
clude endogenous labor supply and money holding choices.6
The economy is populated by forward looking agents with identical preferences and
facing the same constant probability of death, λ ∈ (0,1), in each time period. Birth and
death rates are the same. For analytical convenience, total population is normalized to
one. Hence, in each time period a new cohort of size λ is born and a fraction of equal
6A continuous-time monetary version of the Blanchard-Yaari framework has been previously developed
by Marini and van der Ploeg (1988).
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budget requirements, beyond enhancing the determinacy properties of feedback interestsize of the population dies. At time t the size of the generation born at time s ≤ t is
λ(1 − λ)
t−s. Since the probability of death is constant overtime, the expected life horizon
of an agent born at time s is given by
 ∞
t−s=1(t − s)λ(1 − λ)
t−s−1 = 1/λ. It should be
noted that for λ → 0 the expected lifetime 1/λ → ∞, i.e. agents face an inﬁnite life
horizon.
Since there is no intergenerational altruism and lifetime is uncertain, a perfectly com-
petitive life insurance market is assumed to be operative as in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard
(1985). In particular, in order to avoid unintended bequest, insurance companies collect
ﬁnancial wealth from the deceased members of the population and pay fair premia to
survivors. The zero proﬁt condition in the insurance sector requires that the gross return
on the insurance contract, that is incorporated into the individual ﬂow budget constraint,
is given by 1/(1 − λ).
2.1.1 The Individual Optimizing Problem
Individuals face stochastic sequences of prices, interest rates, taxes and proﬁt shares, and
decide on consumption, real money holdings, labor supply and wealth accumulation. Real
money balances yield direct utility in the spirit of Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975).7
Total non-human wealth consists of money, government bonds and capital.
The objective of the representative agent j belonging to the generation born at time













where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor, Pt is the price index, Cs,t (j) is con-
sumption of the ﬁnal good, Ms,t (j) denote end-of-period money holdings, and Ns,t (j)
represents the agent’s j labor, assumed to be supplied under monopolistic competition.
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where ηt > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated labor inputs, Nt is total













The elasticity of labor demand, ηt, is the same across workers, but is allowed to be time-
variant.
The ﬂow budget constraint of the representative agent j born at time s is
Bs,t+1 (j)
Rt




(As,t (j) + Ws,t (j)Ns,t (j) + Zs,t (j) − Ts,t (j) − PtCs,t (j)), (4)
where Bs,t (j) denote nominal riskless government bonds carried over from period t − 1
and paying one unit of num´ eraire in period t, Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate
on bonds purchased in period t, Qt is the price of capital, Zs,t (j) is the share in the proﬁts
of intermediate goods ﬁrms, Ts,t (j) denote nominal lump-sum net taxes, and As,t (j) is
the total beginning-of-period ﬁnancial wealth given by
As,t (j) ≡ Bs,t (j) + Ms,t−1 (j) +
 





where δ is the depreciation rate and Rk
t indicates the nominal rental cost of capital hold-
ings, Ks,t (j).9
8This demand function derives from the ﬁrms’ optimizing behavior. See section 2.2.
9It should be noticed that the ﬂow budget constraint incorporates the fair premium payment deriving
from the insurance contract. The timing convention is consistent with the discrete time versions of the
Yaari-Blanchard olg model adopted by Frenkel and Razin (1986) and Smets and Wouters (2002).
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set {Cs,0 (j), Ms,0 (j),Ws,0 (j) Bs,1 (j),Ks,1 (j)} and the sequences of contingency plans
{Cs,t (j), Ms,t (j),Ws,t (j), Bs,t+1 (j),Ks,t+1 (j)}∞
t=1 in order to maximize (1) subject to
(2) and (4), given the initial wealth As,0 (j) and the stochastic sequences {Zs,t (j),Ts,t (j),
Rt,Rk
t,Pt,Qt,Wt,Nt}∞
t=0, whose exogenously given probability distributions are known by
the consumers. Proﬁt shares and lump-sum net taxes are age-independent, while newly
born agents do not hold any ﬁnancial assets, for the sake of simplicity.
In order to obtain analytically tractable solutions for aggregate variables, we specialize
















− V (Ns,t (j))
 
, (6)
where V ′ (•),V ′′ (•) > 0. Theoretical foundations that justify the adoption of this utility
function in the perpetual-youth models with endogenous labor supply are developed by
Ascari and Rankin (2006).10




  Cs,t (j)







  Cs,t (j)
  Cs,t+1 (j)
Pt
Pt+1

























where ˜ Cs,t (j) ≡ Cs,t (j)−(PtCs,t (j)/Ms,t (j))
γ V (Ns,t (j)) can be interpreted as consump-
10In particular, Ascari and Rankin (2006) demonstrate that this speciﬁcation of preferences allows
one to rule out a negative labor supply problem which may arise for older generations in models ` a la
Yaari-Blanchard with leisure in the utility function when leisure is a normal good.
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are the stochastic Euler equations, while (9) and (10) represent the eﬃciency static condi-
tions on money demand and labor supply choices, respectively. The optimality condition
for labor supply incorporates the exogenous optimal wage markup uw
t = 1/(ηt − 1), re-
ﬂecting the agent’s market power. Because wages are perfectly ﬂexible, in the symmetric
equilibrium all workers of all generations will set the same wage and supply the same
hours of labor, i.e. Ws,t (j) = Wt and Ns,t (j) = Nt for all j ∈ [0,1].
Let deﬁne the stochastic discount factor of the representative agent j of generation s
as
Λt,t+1(s,j) ≡ β
  Cs,t (j)




Combining (11) with (7) one obtains




for each s ∈ (−∞,t] and j ∈ [0,1]. At the optimum the ﬂow budget constraint (4) holds
with equality in each time period and the transversality condition precluding Ponzi’s






T−t Λt,T (s,j)As,T (j)
 
= 0, (13)
where Λt,T (s,j) ≡
 T
k=T+1 Λk−1,k (s,j) and Λt,t (s,j) ≡ 1. Iterating the budget constraint
(4) forward, using (12), and imposing the transversality condition (13), one can derive
the individual consumption function as:11
Pt   Cs,t (j)= χ
 







T−t Λt,T (s,j)Ψs,T (j)




where χ ≡ (1 − γ)[1 − β (1 − λ)] is invariant both across time and across generations,
11For details see Appendix A.
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July 2006Ψs,t (j) ≡ Ms,t (j)/PtCs,t (j) = {γ/[(1 − γ)(1 − λ)]}[Rt/(Rt − 1)] is identical for all gen-
erations, and Hs,t (j) is human wealth, deﬁned as the expected present discounted value
of future labor incomes and of proﬁt shares net of taxes:




T−t Λt,T(s,j)(Ws,T (j)Ns,T (j) + Zs,T (j) − Ts,T (j)). (15)
2.1.2 Aggregation










Aggregation of all generations alive at time t yields the following expressions for ag-
gregate non-human wealth, aggregate consumption, aggregate real money demand and
aggregate labor supply, respectively:
Bt+1
Rt
+ Mt + QtKt+1 = At + WtNt + Zt − Tt − PtCt, (17)
Pt   Ct = χ
 






























Combining equations (17) and (18) and using the deﬁnition of aggregate human wealth,
Ht (j) ≡ Et
 ∞
T=t (1 − λ)
T−t Λt,T (WTNT + ZT − TT), one obtains the following dynamic
equation for aggregate consumption:12
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consumption is aﬀected by the aggregate level of non-human wealth.
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final Goods Firm
The ﬁnal good representative ﬁrm faces a ces technology, Yt =







Yt denotes aggregate output and Xt (i) is the quantity of intermediate good produced by
intermediate goods ﬁrm i. Intratemporal proﬁt maximization, taking as given the ﬁnal
good price Pt and the prices of the intermediate goods Pt (i), for all i ∈ [0,1], yields the
demand for each variety i as a function of the relative price of i and of total production,
Xt (i) = (Pt (i)/Pt)
−ε Yt. In addition, the zero proﬁt condition implies that the price
index is Pt =






2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Firm
Each intermediate goods producer faces the following production function:
Yt (i) = ̥tKt (i)
α Nt (i)
1−α , (22)
where ̥t is an exogenous technology parameter, and Kt (i) and Nt (i) represent the capital
and labor services used by ﬁrm i, respectively. The labor input used by each producer is













Aggregation across intermediate goods optimizing ﬁrms yields the labor market demand
curve (2).
Following Calvo (1983), nominal price rigidity is modeled by allowing random intervals
between price changes. Each period a ﬁrm adjusts its price with a constant probability
14
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Real marginal cost, MCt, is given by
MCt =












thereby being identical across ﬁrms.
The optimal pricing decision of the ﬁrm i revising its price in period t is to choose the





T−tΛt,TYT (i)(Pt (i) − PTMCT), (26)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
 











T [Pt (i) − (1 + µ
p)PTMCT] = 0, (27)
where µp = 1/(ε − 1) is the equilibrium net markup. From condition (27) it emerges
that ﬁrms set their price equal to a markup over a weighted average of expected future








The representative capital producer employs investment (expressed in the same composite
as the ﬁnal good) and the existing capital stock to produce new capital goods, according to
a standard crs production function, φ(It/Kt)Kt, where φ
′ (•) > 0, φ
′′ (•) ≤ 0, φ
′ (δ) = 1,
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is given by














2.3 The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate, rt ≡ Rt −1. Monetary policy
is assumed to be described in terms of a feedback rule where the instrument rate is set
as an increasing function of the inﬂation rate. Speciﬁcally, the policy reaction function
takes the following form:13
  rt = ρr  rt−1 + (1 − ρr)
 





where   rt ≡ rt − r denotes the deviation of the nominal interest rate from its steady state
level, πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 − 1 is the rate of inﬂation between t and t − 1,   Yt ≡ logYt − logY
is the log-deviation of output from its steady state level, φπ,φY ≥ 0 are parameters
capturing the responsiveness of monetary policy to inﬂation and output, ρr ∈ (0,1) is the









13See, e.g., Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1998, 2000), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor (1999b), Gerlach
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The ﬂow budget constraint of the government in nominal terms is given by
Bt+1
Rt
+ Mt = Bt + Mt−1 + PtGt − Tt, (32)
where Gt denotes real government spending for ﬁnal goods. The ﬁscal authority has
three policy instruments: bonds, government spending, and net lump sum taxes, of which
only two can be chosen freely and the remaining follows residually from the government’s
sequential budget constraint.










where lt ≡ (Bt + Mt−1)/Pt−1 denote total real government liabilities outstanding at the
beginning of period t in units of t − 1 ﬁnal goods, τt ≡ Tt/Pt real tax collections, and
mt ≡ Mt/Pt real money balances.
Our analysis focuses on two alternative ﬁscal policy rules: (i) a debt-based tax rule
of the Leeper (1991)-style; (ii) a balanced-budget rule allowing for bounded deﬁcits or
surpluses, of the kind presented by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000). Both rules are
extended to incorporate a cyclical component in the spirit of Taylor (1998, 2000).
2.4.1 Debt-based Tax Rule
Under a debt-based regime, ﬁscal policy is assumed to be conducted according to the
following feedback tax rule:
  τt = τl  lt + τY   Yt, (34)
where   τt ≡ (τt − τ)/Y and   lt ≡ (lt − l)/Y denote, respectively, the ﬂuctuations of real
taxes and government liabilities, both measured in units of steady-state output, and
τl,τY ≥ 0 are ﬁscal policy parameters. Such a speciﬁcation takes into account both a
17
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component of ﬁscal policy, and an output stabilization motive, reﬂecting the cyclical
component.14
2.4.2 Balanced-budget Rule
As an alternative ﬁscal regime we consider a balanced-budget rule allowing for bounded
deﬁcits or surpluses. As emphasized by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000), this ﬁscal rule is
arguably more realistic than a period-by period balanced budget requirement. In addition,
it is in the spirit of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, which
require country speciﬁc medium term objectives which range from a 1% deﬁcit to a close
to balance or in surplus position, guaranteeing a suﬃcient margin below the reference
value of 3% of GDP for the general government deﬁcit.
The nominal ﬁscal deﬁcit, Dt, is deﬁned as government expenditures and interest
payments on the outstanding public debt net of tax revenues:










+ Mt−1 + Dt. (36)
We assume that ﬁscal policy is described in terms of a feedback rule in the real deﬁcit,
incorporating both an output stabilization motive and a smoothing component.15 In
particular, the ﬁscal rule we consider takes the following form:
dt = ρddt−1 + (1 − ρd)δY   Yt + ε
d
t, (37)
14The so-called ‘Taylor ﬁscal rules’, featuring both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ components, are the object
of recent empirical contributions. See, for instance, Gal´ ı and Perotti (2003), and Favero and Monacelli
(2003, 2005).
15Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000) instead assume exogenous ‘secondary’ deﬁcits, without inertia.
18
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δY ≤ 0 is a ﬁscal policy parameter, ρd ∈ (0,1) is a parameter measuring the persistence






is an i.i.d. ﬁscal policy
shock.
2.5 Market Clearing
Factor and good markets must be in equilibrium, so that the following equalities hold at
all times: Nt =
  1
0 Nt (i)di, Kt =
  1
0 Kt (i)di, Yt (i) = Xt (i), for all i ∈ [0,1], and
Yt = Ct + It + Gt. (38)
3 Calibration
The implications of the foregoing framework are examined by computing a log-linearized
version of the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic steady state with zero in-
ﬂation.16 The log-linearized model is solved in its state-space representation by applying
the Klein (2000) algorithm.17 We parameterize the model on euro area quarterly data for
the period 1970Q1-2003Q4.18 The baseline calibration is reported in Table 1.
The shares of steady-state consumption and private investment in total output are
set consistently with their observed sample averages, 0.2. We set the annual steady state
public debt to GDP ratio at 60%, according to the Maastricht criterion. The observed
annual money velocity is 3.7, using the monetary aggregate M1. We set the steady state
real interest rate equal to 4% per annum, as in Smets and Wouters (2003). We assign a
value of 0.015 to the probability of death between two consecutive periods, as in Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2000).
16See Appendix C for details.
17See Appendix D.
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where ϕ > 0 represents the inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply with respect
to the real wage. We set ϕ equal to 0.47, as in Benigno and Benigno (2003). Furthermore,
we calibrate the steady state fraction of time in employment to be 1/3, according to the
standard eight-hours working day.
The probability of maintaining prices ﬁxed between two consecutive quarters for ﬁrms
subject to nominal rigidities is set equal to 0.75, that is consistent with the estimates
obtained by Gal´ ı, Gertler and L´ opez-Salido (2001) for the euro area. Following Smets
and Wouters (2003), we set the annual depreciation rate, δ, equal to 10% per annum
and the elasticity of output with respect to capital, α, equal to 0.3. Following King and
Watson (1996), the elasticity of investment with respect to asset prices, η, is set equal to
unity. Values of all remaining parameters are set according to the steady state relations
and are reported in Table 1.
We assume that government expenditure follows a univariate autoregressive process
given by
  Gt = ρG   Gt−1 + ε
G
t , (40)
where   Gt ≡ Gt−G
Y . The estimated ﬁrst-order autocorrelation and the standard deviation
of the innovation are ρG = 0.966 and σεG = 0.001, respectively. The technology shock is
also assumed to follow a univariate autoregressive process,
  ̥t = ρ̥  ̥t−1 + ε
̥
t , (41)
where   ̥t ≡ log̥t − log̥. We ﬁt the stochastic process (41) empirically using the
standard Solow residual and obtain ρ̥ = 0.958 and σε̥ = 0.005. Following Smets
and Wouters (2003), the wage markup is assumed to be a white noise. We set the
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and Wouters’ estimates, σuw = 0.003 and σεr = 0.001. Finally, the baseline calibration
of equations (31) and (37) sets ρr,ρd = 0.9, consistently with a realistic high degree of
inertia displayed by monetary and ﬁscal rules.
4 Fiscal Policy and Equilibrium Dynamics
The main feature of the model is that it exhibits wealth eﬀects on aggregate demand that
make the lm relation and the dynamics for both government liabilities and asset prices not
recursive to the equilibrium system.19 This generates a non-trivial interaction between
monetary and ﬁscal policy. On the one hand, ﬁscal policy aﬀects the evolution of aggregate
demand since public debt is net wealth for the living generations, thereby inﬂuencing
inﬂation dynamics. On the other hand, monetary policy aﬀects debt service through
its decisions on the nominal interest rate, hence modifying the dynamics of government
liabilities.
For each ﬁscal rule, we ﬁrst investigate the issue of rational expectations equilibrium
determinacy in order to identify the range of policy parameters ruling out sunspots and
instabilities;20 then we examine impulse response functions to ﬁscal shocks.
4.1 Debt-based Tax Rule
Following Woodford (1998, 2001, 2003), ﬁscal policy is ‘passive’ (or ‘locally Ricardian’) if
and only if the dynamics of real government liabilities implied by the tax rule are bounded
for any bounded processes for the other endogenous variables and for the exogenous
disturbances. According to this deﬁnition, the tax rule (34) is passive (active) if and only
19By contrast, in the standard representative agent setup, real ﬁnancial wealth does not aﬀect con-
sumption dynamics and monetary policy inﬂuences consumption only through the eﬀects produced on
the current and future short-term real interest rates.
20A rational expectations equilibrium is (locally) determined if and only if there are unique bounded
sequences for all endogenous variables of the model in periods t ≥ 0, given the bounded exogenous
disturbances processes. See Woodford (2003).
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July 2006if |(1 + r)(1 − τl)| < (>)1.21 As in Woodford (2003), we focus on rules in which τl ≤ 1.
Thus, our calibration implies that for a passive (active) ﬁscal policy τl must be larger
(smaller) than 0.01.
Figure 1 shows the regions of determinacy of equilibrium under the tax rule for diﬀerent
combinations of ﬁscal and monetary policy parameters. Panel A reveals that a passive
ﬁscal policy regime is compatible with equilibrium determinacy when combined with a
suﬃciently active monetary policy. On the other hand, an active ﬁscal policy requires a
more accommodating monetary policy. As it emerges from panel B, when ﬁscal policy
is passive, the Taylor principle, according to which the long-run response of the nominal
interest rate to increases in inﬂation should be more than one-to-one (φπ > 1), might not
be suﬃcient to achieve equilibrium uniqueness. Indeterminacy is likely to prevail under a
high responsiveness of monetary policy to the ﬂuctuations in output.
In panels C and D we plot determinacy regions in the space of the ﬁscal policy param-
eters (τl,τY) under an active and a passive monetary policy conduct, respectively. When
monetary policy is active, the more countercyclical the ﬁscal policy is (high values of τY),
the higher the reactivity of taxes to government liabilities must be (high values of τl) in
order to ensure equilibrium determinacy. By contrast, under a passive monetary policy
equilibrium uniqueness is more likely to be veriﬁed under a countercyclical ﬁscal policy
and a low reactivity of the ﬁscal burden to government liabilities.
Figure 2 shows the responses of the main variables of the model to a positive unit
shock in government spending under two alternative ﬁscal-monetary policy regimes. As
in Woodford (2003), the size of the ﬁscal shock is normalized to a one percent of steady-
state output.
The ﬁrst regime we investigate (Figure 2(A)) is characterized by a passive ﬁscal policy
combined with an active monetary policy. In particular, we assume τl = 0.1, τY = 0.5,
φπ = 1.5, φY = 0.125 (the values of a standard Taylor rule). One of the main predictions
of the analysis is that the output dynamics display an intertemporal trade-oﬀ: the ﬁscal
21For details see Appendix E.
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eﬀect in the medium run, due to the crowding-out in both private consumption and private
investment. These are negatively aﬀected by the reduction in human wealth (due to higher
future tax burden), higher interest rates and depressed asset prices. Moreover, government
liabilities increase by a sizable amount and remain persistently above the steady state.
At the same time the government budget displays persistent high deﬁcits, while taxes
remain for several periods above their long-term equilibrium in order to preserve ﬁscal
sustainability. It should be noted that the presence of wealth eﬀects inﬂuences the dynamic
response of the economy to an increase in government spending, since currently alive
individuals share the burden of taxation with yet unborn generations. As a result the
negative impact eﬀects on consumption tends to be lower than in a set-up with inﬁnite
horizon.22
In the second policy regime (Figure 2(B)), we study, instead, the case of an active ﬁscal
rule coupled with with a passive interest rate rule. Speciﬁcally, we set τl = 0, τY = 0.5,
φπ = φY = 0 (implying a pegged interest rate). We see that when the tax rule does not
ensure a convergent pattern for real government liabilities for any bounded sequence of the
other endogenous variables, a government spending shock causes output, consumption,
investment, capital and asset prices to increase persistently above their steady state values.
These expansionary eﬀects are sustained by both the passive behavior of monetary policy,
implying cumulative decreases in the real interest rate, and the wealth eﬀects on aggregate
demand, that are ampliﬁed by the ‘non-Ricardian’ ﬁscal policy. As a result, in equilibrium,
the inﬂationary eﬀects necessary to prevent an explosive dynamics for real government
liabilities are about ﬁve times larger than in the previous ﬁscal-monetary regime.
22By contrast, in the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers, under a passive debt-based tax rule, an
increase in government spending is likely to lead to a rise in aggregate private consumption. See Gal´ ı,
L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es (2003).
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The evolution of real government liabilities under a balanced-budget rule allowing for
temporary ﬁscal deﬁcits of the type described by (37) exhibits a unit root.23 There-
fore a balanced-budget rule cannot be strictly classiﬁed according to the active/passive
dichotomy in Woodford’s (2003) sense and deserves a separate analysis.24
Figure 3 shows that in our framework with wealth eﬀects this particular ﬁscal regime
is compatible with a larger class of interest rate rules of Taylor’s type by enlarging the
parameter space under which determinacy is guaranteed (see panel B)25, unless ﬁscal
policy is too much countercyclical (see panel A). In particular, under passive monetary
policies, where the nominal interest rate responds less than proportionally to inﬂation
changes, or under interest rate pegging rules, the system is not characterized by sunspot
ﬂuctuations or instabilities as in the standard inﬁnite horizon framework. Under balanced-
budget requirements, intergenerational wealth eﬀects work as ‘automatic stabilizers’, not
forcing necessarily the central bank to implement aggressive interest rate rules. Hence,
an interesting advantage of our set-up is that it enables one to study the impact of ﬁscal
policy shock under a wider range of monetary policy rules.
Figure 4 plots the impulse response functions to a unit shock to government spend-
ing under both active (φπ > 1) and passive (φπ < 1) interest rate rules, respectively.
Analysing the impulse responses under the alternative monetary policy rules, it emerges
that the responses of the variables to the shocks are critically aﬀected by the conduct of
monetary policy. Speciﬁcally, under an active monetary policy (Figure 4(A)), assuming
φπ = 1.5, φY = 0.125 and δY = −0.5, the dynamics are similar to those obtained in the
case of a passive tax rule. Output increases on impact, but declines thereafter below the
long run equilibrium, returning very slowly to the steady state. Inﬂation increases on im-
23See equation (A.32) in Appendix C.
24Broadly speaking, as emphasized by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000), the balanced-budget rule could
be considered ‘passive’ in Leeper (1991)’s sense, since it implies that taxes are an increasing function of
the stock of public debt.
25An analytical proof of this result has been derived by Annicchiarico and Piergallini (2006) in a
simpliﬁed dsge framework with no capital accumulation and real money balances.
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converge back to the steady state. However, looking at the magnitude, one can notice
that the jump in inﬂation and the decrease of the other variables are less pronounced
than those obtained under the tax rule. Moreover, the balanced-budget is preserved,
given the strong response of taxes to the government spending shock implied by the ﬁscal
regime. Conversely, when the monetary rule is passive (Figure 4(B)), assuming φπ = 0.5,
φY = 0.125 and δY = −0.5, the patterns are distinctly diﬀerent. It is possible to notice an
increase on impact on output, capital, investment, consumption and asset prices, given
the accommodative behavior of the monetary authority.26 However, the cost to be paid
is represented by the increase in inﬂation which on impact is almost the double than in
the active monetary policy case.
In the case of balanced-budget rules, it is also of interest to analyse the eﬀects of
a tax shock, represented by an exogenous disturbance to the rule assuming a ﬁxed and
exogenous government expenditure. Figure 5 illustrates the eﬀects of a unit tax cut under
active and passive monetary policies, respectively. While the results are similar to the
case of the government spending shock, it is worth pointing out that a tax cut aﬀects all
variables. In the general framework adopted in this paper Ricardian equivalence does not
hold and the time proﬁle of taxes inﬂuences the distribution of wealth across generations.
By contrast, in an inﬁnite horizon model where the Ricardian equivalence prevails, tax
cuts would not have any real eﬀects.
5 Stochastic Simulations
In this Section we explore the performance of alternative ﬁscal rules or diﬀerent combi-
nations of monetary and ﬁscal rules by using Montecarlo experiments. We draw from a









for a sample period
of 200 quarters. All values reported in Tables 2-4 represent mean values of the standard
26This theoretical result is compatible with the empirical ﬁndings of Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
showing an increase in private consumption in response to a positive government spending shock.
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cations of the simulation experiment. The magnitudes shown in the Tables are expressed
in percentage points.
The ﬁrst simulation exercise reported in Table 2 investigates the performance of mon-
etary and ﬁscal policies under feedback tax rules ensuring the convergence of government
liabilities dynamics for any bounded paths for the remaining endogenous variables. The
results indicate that higher values for the monetary policy inﬂation coeﬃcient φπ lead
to lower standard deviations for the inﬂation rate. Moreover, it is shown that an inter-
est rate rule featuring a response to output entails in most cases a higher variability in
all variables of interest. This conclusion reinforces the results developed by McCallum
(2001), and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004).
Table 3 reports simulation results under the assumption that ﬁscal policy is conducted
according to an active tax rule. The results suggest that when the stability of government
liabilities is not guaranteed by ﬁscal authorities, an interest rate peg rule is predicted to
perform better, in terms of inﬂation stabilization, than feedback interest rate rules ` a la
Taylor. Intuitively, a feedback monetary rule reacting to inﬂation dramatically worsens the
dynamics of government liabilities when budgetary policies are potentially unsustainable,
thereby pinning down a higher inﬂation rate necessary to reduce the real value of public
debt. Hence, the well-known revaluation mechanism depicted by the ‘ﬁscal theory of the
price level’ is fully at work. In addition, large values for τY, capturing the response of the
tax rule to output, entail excessive variability.
Table 4 summarizes simulation results under balanced-budget requirements. As em-
phasized in the previous sections, in our olg framework this ﬁscal regime permits to com-
pare the performance of both active and passive monetary policies, since the prospects for
determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium are enlarged. Active interest rate rules
that do not feature an output stabilization motive imply a lower variability for inﬂation,
but they are likely to entail a higher variability for both output and asset prices. Further-
more, the results support the view that strong responses of ﬁscal policy to output might
26
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be undesirable.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
price stickiness and capital accumulation, extended to include overlapping generations.
An important feature of our economy with ﬁnitely-lived individuals is that the dynamics
for government liabilities and asset prices as well as the lm relation signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
monetary and ﬁscal policy transmission mechanisms, because wealth eﬀects do inﬂuence
aggregate consumption dynamics.
The general framework presented in the paper is ﬂexible enough for analyzing the
eﬀects of diﬀerent ﬁscal policy rules (and their interaction with monetary policy) in terms
of macroeconomic stability and price developments. The analysis of the performance
of debt-based tax rules and balanced-budget rules allowing for temporary deﬁcits shows
that the positive eﬀect on economic activity generated by ﬁscal expansions is likely to be
signiﬁcantly reversed in the medium run.
Another interesting insight of our set-up is that the balanced-budget rule is able to
enlarge the determinacy space under feedback interest rate rules. This allows the evalu-
ation of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy under both active and passive monetary policies. In
this respect, we have shown that the dynamics generated by ﬁscal shocks are critically
inﬂuenced by the monetary policy regime. On the one hand, ﬁscal policies aimed at
balancing the budget are compatible with passive monetary policies; on the other hand,
active monetary policies in conjunction with a balanced budget rule deliver a high degree
of price stability (at the expense of output volatility).
Modeling the demand-side of the economy through an overlapping generations struc-
ture allowed us to analyze not only the eﬀect of government spending shocks but also
tax cut shocks, thereby increasing the number of potential policy experiments one can
perform using the model derived in the paper.
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policy might be essential for an empirical characterization of the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks. In
other words, results of the empirical literature on the eﬀect of ﬁscal policies on macroeco-
nomic variables could have been negatively inﬂuenced by the exclusion of the interaction
between monetary and ﬁscal policies.
Appendixes
Appendix A: Individual Consumption
Combining (12) with (8) we obtain:
Et {Λt,t+1 (s,j)Rt} = Et
 
Λt,t+1 (s,j)





Using (A.1) we can write:
Bs,t+1(j)
Rt + Ms,t (j) + QtKs,t+1 (j)






Bs,t+1 (j) + Ms,t (j) +
 








Thus, the individual ﬂow budget constraint can be written as
PtCs,t (j) + (1 − λ) Rt−1
Rt Ms,t (j) + (1 − λ)Et {Λt,t+1 (s,j)As,t+1 (j)}
≤ As,t (j) + Ws,t (j)Ns,t (j) + Zs,t (j) − Ts,t (j),
(A.3)
where
As,t (j) ≡ Bs,t (j) + Ms,t−1 (j) +
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Thus, the ﬂow budget constraint can be re-written as
1
1−γPt   Cs,t (j) + (1 − λ)Et {Λt,t+1 (s,j)As,t+1 (j)}














T=t (1 − λ)
T−t Λt,T (s,j)PT   Cs,T (j)
≤ As,t (j) + Et
 ∞
T=t (1 − λ)












Using the fact that
Et
 
Λt,T (s,j)PT   Cs,T (j)
 
= β
T−tPt   Cs,t (j), (A.8)
into equation (A.7) (which in the optimum holds with equality), one obtains equation
(14) in the main text.
Appendix B: The Dynamic Equation for Aggregate Consumption
Using (12) we can write:
Bt+1





Bt+1 + Mt +
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July 2006Thus, the aggregate budget constraint can also be written as:
Et {Λt,t+1At+1} + PtCt +
Rt − 1
Rt
Mt = At + WtNt + Zt − Tt, (A.10)
where At denotes aggregate non-human wealth at the beginning of period t, deﬁned as:
At ≡ Bt + Mt−1 +
 













Substituting (A.10) into (18) and using (A.12) one obtains:




Et {Λt,t+1At+1} + 1
1−γPtCt + Et
 ∞












where Ωt = WtNt + Zt − Tt. Leading (18) one period forward yields:


















Multiplying both sides by Λt,t+1 (1 − λ) and taking expectations:
(1 − λ)Et
 






(1 − λ)Et {Λt,t+1At+1} + Et
 ∞
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T=t+1 (1 − λ)
T−t Λt,TΩT, using the fact that χ ≡ (1 − γ)[1 − β (1 − λ)],
and substituting into (A.13), one obtains:




Et {Λt,t+1At+1} − (1 − λ)Et {Λt,t+1At+1}
+ 1






+ (1 − λ)Et
 














Λt,t+1Pt+1   Ct+1
 
(A.17)
Rearranging (A.17), we obtain the dynamic equation for aggregate adjusted consumption,





Λt,t+1Pt+1   Ct+1
 
+
λ(1 − γ)[1 − β (1 − λ)]
β (1 − λ)
Et {Λt,t+1At+1}, (A.18)
which is equation (21) in the main text.
Appendix C: Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
This Appendix performs a ﬁrst-order log-linear approximation of the global system around
a non-stochastic steady state characterized by zero inﬂation and positive public debt. In
general, we let   Xt ≡ logXt − logX be the log-deviation of a given economic variable Xt
from its steady state value X.
On the demand-side, the log-linear version of the dynamic equation for aggregate
adjusted consumption (21) is given by
    Ct = −
 















  at+1, (A.19)
where at ≡ At




  C. The aggregate real ﬁnancial wealth approxi-
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  at+1 ≡ s
−1









Pt, sa ≡ a





(r+δ)(1+up). Aggregate adjusted consumption
approximates to
    Ct ≡
C
  C














  Nt, (A.21)
where ϕ ≡ V ′′ (N) N
V ′(N) is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, C


















1−γ Ψ−γNϕ. The equation describing asset
prices dynamics can be derived as
  qt =
1
R











t+1 −   Pt+1
 
− (  rt − Et {πt+1}), (A.22)
where rk
t ≡ Rk
t − 1 and   rk
t ≡ rk
t − rk. The log-linearized equation for investment demand
is
  It −   Kt = η  qt, (A.23)









. From (19), one can derive the lm relation as
  mt =   Ct −
1
R − 1
  rt. (A.24)
The labor supply equation (20) can be expressed as
  wt = ϕ   Nt +
γ
R − 1
  rt + u
w
t , (A.25)
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In addition, the aggregate production function can be approximated as
  Yt =   ̥t + α   Kt + (1 − α)   Nt. (A.28)
The law of motion of capital (29) becomes
  Kt+1 = δ  It + (1 − δ)   Kt. (A.29)
Market clearing in the goods’ market implies
  Yt = sC   Ct + sI  It +   Gt, (A.30)
where sC ≡ C
Y , sI ≡ I
Y , and   Gt ≡ Gt−G
Y .
On the public sector-side, the log-linear version of the evolution of government liabil-
ities (33) is given by
  lt+1 = R
 
  lt −
d
Y
πt +   Gt −   τt
 
+ sb  rt − (R − 1)sm  mt, (A.31)
where sb ≡ B




Working Paper Series No 661
July 2006
On the supply-side, the log-linear approximations to the optimal price setting equationUnder the balanced-budget rule, equation (36) can be approximated as
  lt+1 =   lt + sb (  rt −   rt−1 − πt) − rsm (  mt −   mt−1) − Rsmπt + Rdt. (A.32)
Appendix D: Model Solution






























































nF: number of non-predetermined variables;
nS: number of predetermined variables;
nF: number of exogenous stochastic processes;
F t =
 
  Yt |   Ct |   It |     Ct |   Nt |   qt |   rt |   rk
t |   wt |   MCt |   τt
 ′




  rt−1 |   τt−1 |   lt |   mt−1 |   Kt
 ′
is the vector of predetermined variables;
Et =
 





is the vector of exogenously given stochastic processes











vector of white noises and Σ being the nE×nE diagonal matrix reporting the autoregressive
coeﬃcients of the exogenous variables. The relevant matrices of the system depend on
the ﬁscal rule adopted by the government.
The multivariate linear rational expectations model can be solved by applying the
algorithm proposed by Klein (2000), which is based on the generalized Schur decompo-
sition. We have applied Klein’s algorithm to solve the model under the alternative ﬁscal
rules deﬁned in the main text.
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July 2006Appendix E: ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Fiscal Policy
After substituting the tax rule (34) into (A.31), government liabilities evolve as
  lt+1 = R
 
(1 − τl)  lt −
d
Y
πt +   Gt − τY   Yt
 
+ sb  rt − (R − 1)sm  mt. (A.33)
Under the tax rule (34) stability of the government liabilities process requires that the
coeﬃcient on   lt be less than one, so that ﬁscal policy is passive (active) if and only if
|R(1 − τl)| < (>)1. Hence, the restriction |R(1 − τl)| < 1 rules out any explosive path
of the government liabilities.
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Steady state real interest rate r 0.01
Steady state public spending to output ratio G/Y 0.2
Steady state investment to output ratio I/Y 0.2
Steady state public debt to output ratio b/Y 2.4
Steady state money velocity PY/M 0.925
Probability of death λ 0.015
Time in employment N 1/3
Inverse of the (Frisch) labor supply elasticity ϕ 0.47
Degree of price stickiness θ 0.75
Elasticity of output with respect to capital α 0.3
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Degree of inertia in the monetary rule ρr 0.9
Degree of inertia in the balanced-budget rule ρd 0.9
Implied Parameters
Discount factor β 0.998
Weight of money in the utility function γ 0.018
Consumption to output ratio C/Y 0.6
Capital to output ratio K/Y 8.0
Steady state primary surplus to output ratio (τ − G)/Y 0.024
Consumption to subsistence consumption ratio C/
 
C −   C
 
3.0
Price mark-up up 0.071
Steady state wage mark-up uw 0.092
Shocks
Persistence of public spending shock ρG 0.966
Persistence of technology shock ρ̥ 0.958
Standard deviation of public spending shock σG 0.001
Standard deviation of monetary shock σr 0.001
Standard deviation of wage-push shock σuw 0.003
Standard deviation of technology shock σ̥ 0.005
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simulation results under a passive tax rule
Values of φπ, φY
































































Note: Table reports standard deviations of πt,   Yt,   rt, and   qt, respectively (percentages).
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simulation results under an active tax rule
Values of φπ, φY
































































Note: Table reports standard deviations of πt,   Yt,   rt, and   qt, respectively (percentages).
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determinacy space under a tax rule
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July 2006FIGURE 2
impulse response functions to a unit government spending shock under a
tax rule
A: Passive Fiscal Policy and Active Monetary Policy


















































B: Active Fiscal Policy and Passive Monetary Policy




















































Working Paper Series No 661
July 2006FIGURE 3
determinacy space under a balanced-budget rule
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July 2006FIGURE 4
impulse response functions to a unit government spending shock under a
balanced-budget rule
A: Active Monetary Policy


















































B: Passive Monetary Policy
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July 2006FIGURE 5
impulse response functions to a unit tax shock under a balanced-budget
rule
A: Active Monetary Policy


















































B: Passive Monetary Policy
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